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1. NATURE AND BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT 
HE KURDISH CONFLICT in Turkey has been a prolonged affair. The 
year 1984 marked a new start for the contemporary emergence of the 
Kurdish problem on the Turkish political agenda.1 Since then the con-
flict has persisted in the form of guerrilla movements and limited warfare 
between Turkish government forces and the PKK (The Kurdish Workers' 
Party). The position of the government has been that the preservation of the 
unity and the territorial integrity of the country cannot be jeopardized. The 
PKK's declared aims, on the other hand, range from cultural and political rights 
as an identity group to federalism and separate statehood.2 
This has been an increasingly costly conflict. It is estimated that since 1984, 
some 20,000 people have lost their lives. In 3,000 villages, schools are shut, 
leaving 1.5 million children without education. Around 500 medical care 
centers are closed. Over 3,000 villages have been evacuated. Three million 
people have migrated from the region.3 The government's annual expenditure 
on this conflict is estimated to be around USD 8 billion. The PKK's annual 
budget is around USD 3 billion.4 Today the conflict has reached what can only 
be described as a stalemate. No new attempt - whether made by the govern-
ment or by the PKK - to change the flow of the events is likely to have a 
significant impact on the status quo. 
As the conflict has unfolded, it has created new actors and issues. By-
products of the conflict include drug (mostly heroin) trafficking and the emer-
gence of new power-centers in the political system, and the rehabilitation 
problem of the homecoming soldiers. In November 1996, a political scandal 
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which resulted in the resignation of the minister of internal affairs exposed an 
intricate web of relations among different suspected criminals, government 
officials and the police force. When all the pieces of information are put 
together, the following picture emerges. The main income of the PKK is drug 
money and extortion.5 For a time, the Kurdish mafia in Istanbul and in Europe 
acted as the marketing agents. The gambling business, again owned by the 
Kurdish drug-lords, was used for money laundering. In 1993, the Turkish 
government, seeking to curb the PKK's revenues, hired some extreme Turkish 
nationalist outlaws to eliminate the Kurdish mafia in Istanbul. The task was 
accomplished successfully. 
Then the nationalist mafia took over the drug business. The new dealers 
failed to market the drugs in Europe. This resulted in an attempt to target the 
domestic market and drug prices dropped drastically there. This coincided 
with an alarming increase in drug-related deaths among Turkish youth. The 
claim was made recently that Turkey had become a major drug supplier to the 
West, providing 80% of drugs consumed there.6 
The Kurdish conflict has also created other power centers. For example, pro-
government feudal tribes in the southeast region which were armed by the 
state to fight against the PKK have become small military powers in them-
selves. The Bucak tribe currently commands 10,000 armed men. There is 
evidence that some village guards7 and other government appointees have 
been engaged in drug trafficking and arms sales. In Yuksekova a group com- 
THE KURDISH CONFLICT IN TURKEY 441 
posed of members of the special team, village guards and the police committed 
various illegal activities, representing themselves as PKK members. To date, 
3,687 village guards - out of 60,000 - have been dismissed from their jobs 
because of illegal activities. 
Another issue is the rehabilitation problem of the homecoming soldiers. It is 
reported that 27.8% of the soldiers who were referred to a major military hospital 
with psychological complaints were diagnosed as suffering from the Vietnam 
Syndrome. The recorded ratio for US soldiers during the Vietnam War was 27%.8 
The Kurdish conflict is one of Turkey's major challenges in the post-Cold 
War period. The dimensions of this severe problem have several aspects. The 
first is economic. Over one third of the annual budget of the central government 
is spent on the conflict. Hence it represents a major factor behind high budget 
deficits (and the associated inflation rate of around 80%). Along with interest 
expenditures on public debt, military expenditures have crowded out expendi-
tures on the social sector such as health and education as well as public 
investment. Rising unemployment and a decrease in social services are some of 
the by-products of the worsening economic situation. This, in turn, has had a 
detrimental effect on the social fabric and contributed to the strengthening of 
radical Islam, ethnic polarization, and nationalism. Another related aspect is 
the refugee problem. People who had to leave the region pose important social 
and economic problems in the metropolitan areas. 
The second aspect is democracy. The measures taken to control the conflict act 
to impede the development of democracy in Turkey. Missing persons, torture, 
and forced migration are the points most often mentioned in the human rights 
reports of both Turkish and international nongovernmental organizations. 
Similarly, democratization packages seeking the abolition of articles in the 
Constitution which constrain freedom of thought and expression - such as 
article 8 - and certain institutions such as the state security courts have failed to 
materialize. The complex web of relations among suspected criminals, govern-
ment officials and the police force proves the existence of state-privileged 
illegal groups in politics, raising doubts about whether the rule of law exists in 
Turkey. The human rights record is an issue in Turkey's international relations 
as well. It has featured prominently in international discussions about the 
Cyprus problem and negotiations for full membership in the European Union. 
The third is the international aspect. The Kurdish issue has become a con-
straint on the formulation of Turkish foreign policies. Post-Cold War Turkish 
foreign policy is static, defensive, and reactive, and avoids taking risks. Anti-
PKK lobbying and containing the PKK's threat to Turkey's security have 
become the main, if not the only, focus of foreign policy. This prevents the 
generation of multilateral cooperative strategies which might enhance Tur-
key's interests in the long run. Turkey's relations with its neighbors - Syria, 
Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Russia, Greece - are mostly governed by the level of 
support these countries provide to the PKK. Accordingly, the solution of the 
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water conflict between Turkey and Syria is connected to the Syrian-PKK 
relationship. Turkey's relations with Iraq are heavily influenced by the politi-
cal status of northern Iraq, and, indirectly, by the status of the PKK in the 
region. Armenia, Russia, and Greece, it is often claimed, are all providing 
supporting for the separatist organization. The Kurdish issue put constraints 
on Turkey in the formulation of its policies towards Cyprus and Turkish 
minorities in Greece and Bulgaria.9 
2. TURKISH POLITICAL ACTORS: CONTEXTS AND PERCEPTIONS 
In this section the attitudes of different Turkish political actors - the armed 
forces, the President of the Republic, political parties, and interest groups -
towards the sources of the Kurdish conflict are examined and identified.10 Their 
views are as expressed in the Turkish written and broadcast media. 
(1) Turkish Armed Forces: This is a struggle against a terrorist group (PKK) and 
its international supporters who desire to destabilize and weaken the political, 
economic, and territorial integrity of Turkey. The armed forces draw a parallel 
between the current situation and the Turkish War of Independence (1919-23), 
and want to show the same bravery against foreign enemies. Such suggestions 
as opening communication channels with the other party, or holding indirect 
talks with the PKK, are automatically considered to be an assault on the 
involvement and raison d'etre of the Turkish army. 
The reaction of the army to a peaceful solution to the conflict can be summa-
rized as follows: The armed struggle against the PKK has been going on for the 
past 13 years. Attempts to establish a dialogue or advocate a political solution 
will impede these efforts and cannot justify the casualties suffered during this 
period. The use of the Kurdish language in private and on national television is 
against the existing constitution, and to grant any such official right is the first 
step to separatism. Indeed, the army sees any constitutional right conceded to 
the Kurds as the first concession on the road to separation. Constitutional rights 
will lead first to claims for autonomy, later for federation and finally separa-
tion. High-ranking soldiers in the field, on the other hand, claim that their 
responsibility is limited to the military aspect of the issue. They believe that it is 
the job of the civil authority to deal with the other aspects of this conflict such as 
the improvement of living conditions in Kurdish areas11  Recently the military 
invited the private sector to invest in the region, on the grounds that without 
such local-level investment, the PKK cannot be defeated. 
(2) The President: In 1991, Suleyman Demirel, prime minister in the coalition 
government, acknowledged the existence of a 'Kurdish reality' in Turkey in a 
speech in Diyarbakir.12 In 1993, however, he declared that extending cultural 
rights to the Kurds would be a concession to terrorism. Unless terrorism comes 
to an end, cultural rights cannot be an item on the agenda. After Demirel 
became president in 1994, he, for the first time, pronounced the idea of 'Consti- 
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tutional Citizenship', that is, citizenship based on constitutional rights and not 
on nationality. He also talked about the idea of 'transformation from a nation 
state to a human-rights state'. By contrast, in 1996, Demirel strongly opposed 
the idea of having a dialogue with the PKK through an intermediary by saying 
that the state cannot negotiate with terrorists. According to some, Demirel is 
searching intellectually for a solution to the issue but shies away from taking 
initiatives because of the sensitive political climate.13 
(3) Democratic Left Party (DSP): The DSP is a centre-left party and the minority 
partner in the current coalition government that came to power in June 1997. 
The party emphasizes the economic underdevelopment of the region and 
claims that the existing feudal structure has a negative affect on development. 
Underdevelopment makes the region vulnerable to separatist attempts, and 
neighboring countries take advantage of this. According to the DSP, the power 
vacuum in northern Iraq is another aggravating factor and has to be filled by 
the Turkish Army. A security system through a buffer zone must be con-
structed along the Iraqi border. The feudal structure should be demolished 
through public investments and land reform.14 The DSP does not recognize the 
cultural and ethnic dimensions of the problems. 
(4) National Action Party (MHP): The MHP is an ultra-nationalist, right-wing 
party. It advocates that PKK terrorism is a conspiracy against Turkey engi-
neered by external forces such as Greece, Armenia, and Syria whose aim is to 
destabilize Turkey and cause it to disintegrate. The Kurdish problem will stop 
if external support ends. Military measures are the only way to deal with this 
problem. The army is not well equipped to fight against terrorism, so special 
military forces will have to be created.15 According to the MHP, the Kurds have 
been their brothers for centuries. The party does not recognize a separate 
Kurdish ethnic identity. As regards the possibility of a political solution, the 
state cannot negotiate with terrorists, bandits, and criminals. Any political 
solution will lead to the questioning of the existing state system, which in turn 
will cause the disintegration of the state. Therefore, says the MHP, political 
solutions are out of the question.16 
(5) Welfare Party (RP): The RP, the main Islamist party in Turkey, was in 
government as a senior coalition member from June 1996 to June 1997. In its 
election declaration in October 1991, it argued that there was not a southeastern 
problem but a problem of the regime, and it stressed Islam as a unifying factor.17 
A recent declaration by Abdullah Gul, the former State Minister and a key 
political figure from the Welfare party, suggests that this view has not changed. 
In November 1996, Gul stated that 'Racist approaches to the conflict are wrong, 
and may result in a civil war. The problem can only be solved by relying on one 
common denominator; Muslim brotherhood. This is not only a remedy to the 
problems of southeastern Turkey but also to the relations in the larger area 
concerned, i.e. relations between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.'18 
In his party's fourth convention in October 1993, Necmettin Erbakan, the RP's 
leader, said that the region was under pressure from the state. He made the 
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following points: The power of the armed forces is increasing, and the warlike 
situation continues. The problem cannot be solved through the use of violence 
and indirect assimilation. Kurds and terrorism are two concepts that should be 
treated separately. The right to broadcast and educate in the Kurdish language 
should be granted. The state of emergency has to be abolished.'9 
(6) Motherland Party (ANAP): This is a center-right party, the majority partner 
in the current coalition government. ANAP supports the struggle to eliminate 
terrorism. On the other hand, it also claims that military action is not the only 
solution to the problem and should be complemented by economic and social 
measures. ANAP's 1995 election declaration made the following promises on 
the Kurdish issue: (a) the state of emergency imposed by the government in the 
southeast would be abolished; (b) the village guard system would be revised; 
(c) measures to enhance the right of self-expression would be taken; (d) reset 
tled people would receive compensation for their losses; and (e) economic and 
social development of the region would be encouraged. 
(7) Republican People's Party (CHP): As a party of the centre-left, it also 
differentiates between terrorism and the Kurdish problem. It claims that the 
principle of the unitary state and Turkish as the official language should be 
preserved. The CHP considers the problem as one of democratization. Freedom 
of expression, the establishment of Kurdish TV, and other cultural institutions 
are measures that should complement military measures. 
(8) True Path Party (DYP): For the DYP, a center-right party, the PKK is a 
terrorist organization and the conflict is a straggle between terrorists and the 
state. In its 1995 election declaration, the DYP announced a construction project 
and an action plan to improve the worsening economic conditions in the region. 
Among its specific suggestions were improvements in irrigation systems, and 
developing the textile, animal husbandry, and construction industries.20 
(9) Worker's Party (IP): The IP, a leftist party, claims that the main reason behind 
the problem is the US interest in the region. The creation of a de facto Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq, after the Gulf War, is a direct result of US economic interest 
in the region. This problem cannot be solved without opposing the USA. Further-
more, a change in the Turkish Constitution is required: according to IP leader 
Dogu Perincek, the first sentence of the Amasya declaration of Kemal Ataturk 
states that 'Turkey is the homeland of the Turks and Kurds'.21 
 
(10) Democratic Mass Party (DKP): The DKP, a newly established Kurdish 
party, was founded in January 1997 by a former CHP deputy, Serafettin Elci. It 
is a 'moderate' Kurdish party in terms of its distance from the PKK and its 
adoption of liberal policies and its view on Islam. The DKP's founders claim 
that their primary objective is to solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Reor-
ganization of the state, recognition of the Kurdish identity, cultural rights for 
the Kurdish community, decentralization, and state reform are policies that 
DKP has in its party program.22 
(11) Democratic Peace Party (DBF): This is another new political party mainly 
composed of the members of the Alawite23 sect of the population. According to 
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this party, the main reason for the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is the imposition of 
a single identity by the state and its failure in economic and social affairs. 
Developmental gaps among regions, especially poor economic and social condi-
tions in the southeast are related important causes of the conflict. Democratiza-
tion and implementation of economic and social measures which will help 
abolish the tribal (feudal) relationships and decrease interregional developmen-
tal discrepancies have been suggested for the resolution of this conflict.24 
(12) MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association): 
MUSIAD is a business association composed of Islamist industrialists and 
businessmen. Erol Yarar, the President of MUSIAD, emphasizes the role of Syria 
in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and argues that 'The water problem between 
Syria and Turkey seems to be the key issue in the conflict. With an agreement on 
the water problem with Syria we can eliminate the PKK in six months.'25 
(13) TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens' Association): TUSIAD is 
one of the most influential interest groups in Turkey. Prominent businessmen 
and industrialists in TUSIAD note the need to extend cultural rights to the 
Kurds, and draw a line between terrorism and the need for accommodating the 
Kurdish identity.26 Can Paker, a former member of TUSIAD's executive board, 
claims that Turkey's international credibility cannot be regained until the 
Kurdish and Cyprus problems have been solved. According to Paker, the war 
consumes an extraordinary amount of wealth. Only the gray economy, which 
could be almost three times of the size of the state budget, has prevented 
economic disasters. 
(14) TUGIAT (Turkish Young Businessmen's Association): Murat Bedik, the 
president of the TUGIAT executive board, focuses on the economic and social 
development of the southeast, and states that' the worsening economic condi 
tions in the southeast region and the spread of terrorism are two related 
phenomena. Therefore, top priority should be given to the economic and social 
development of the region. Development projects should be prepared and 
implemented with the collaboration of the locals. The role of the NGOs is 
crucial in this process. They are the primary agents who will establish a 
dialogue between the locals and the establishment. If their voices are heard, 
they will serve as a means to create a critical mass on the issue.'27 
3. CONFLICT INTERVENTION/MANAGEMENT ATTEMPTS REVIEWED 
Different attempts at intervention have been made by the business community, 
peace activists, and NGOs. Various research reports have been prepared by 
different interest groups on aspects of the conflict. Examples include studies 
sponsored by Turkish Union of Chambers,28 the Union of the Turkish Metal 
Workers, the Center for Political Psychology of the Prime Ministry, and by Sakip 
Sabanci, a prominent businessman and public figure. TUSIAD has repeatedly 
warned the government about the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict. On 
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the initiative of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 'East Holding' has been 
established with the participation of different prominent business people - from 
and outside the region - with the aim of helping the economic development of 
the eastern and southeastern region. A 'one million votes for peace' campaign 
was launched by a group of peace activists. The 'Peace Express', a trip by train 
from Istanbul to Diyarbakir, and the film documenting this venture, 'Cinema for 
Peace', are other civic attempts by the Human Rights Association. 'Saturday 
Mothers', the relatives of missing people, meet every Saturday in Istanbul to 
make their voices heard. 'Search conferences' on the Kurdish problem, by the 
White Point Foundation, have been arranged with broad participation by intel-
lectuals of both Turkish and Kurdish origin. The Turkish branch of the Helsinki 
Citizens Assembly conducts projects in the region with local officials, on com-
munity rebuilding and governance issues. The Foundation for the Research of 
Societal Problems (TOSAV) is a recent NGO which aims at constructive dia-
logue between the Turkish and Kurdish communities. 
At the governmental level there have been different attempts to deal with this 
problem.29 The pioneer was Turgut Ozal, the late prime minister and President 
of the Republic, who was the first to launch the 'melting pot' idea in the Turkish 
context. On 20 August 1989, Ozal, then prime minister, in a meeting in Istanbul 
with the members of the US Helsinki Commission, claimed that one of his 
grandmothers was Kurdish.30 Before his death in 1993 he said that he was open 
to discussion of the idea of a federation. 
Recent governments have come to power with differing agendas for dealing 
with the Kurdish problem: Demirel of the DYP in 1989; followed by Ciller, also 
DYP, in the summer of 1993; then Yilmaz of ANAP; and the Welfare-True Path 
coalition in June 1996-97. All these prime ministers began their political terms 
with mild positions on the Kurdish problem but later either became hardliners 
or changed their position as their term in office progressed.31 
In the summer of 1996, the mediation attempt to solve the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey by the Welfare Party and the True Path Party coalition government 
illustrates the dynamics of this transition. After Turgut Ozal's death, Erbakan's 
initiative on the problem was one of the more radical efforts. For the first time, 
in August 1996, there was an effort at active mediation. Erbakan, former 
Islamist prime minister of Turkey, used an Islamic writer and NGO spokes-
person, Ismail Nacar from the Committee for Peace, Fraternity, and Solidarity, 
in the mediation effort described below. 
3.1 The Background to the Mediation Attempt 
After Erbakan had become prime minister in June 1996, Zubeyir Aydar, presi-
dent of the executive committee of the Kurdish parliament-in-exile, called Nacar 
and proposed that he mediate in this dispute. Nacar contacted Erbakan through 
Welfare Party deputies and met with him on 27 July 1996. At this meeting 
Erbakan said his primary mission was to stop the bloodshed and end this 
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conflict. Erbakan appointed Fethullah Erbas, the Welfare Party deputy for Van in 
eastern Turkey, to conduct negotiations along with Nacar. This development 
was interpreted as bestowing Erbakan's blessing on direct talks with the PKK. 
Three days later, Nacar and Fethullah Erbas paid a visit to the imprisoned 
Kurdish deputies from the Democracy Party (DEP) with special permission from 
the Ministry of Justice. Nacar also contacted Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the 
PKK, and the president of the Kurdish parliament-in-exile. These developments 
were leaked to the press and opened a public debate on the issue. The CHP, DSP, 
MHP, ANAP were all extremely critical, on the principle that the state should not 
negotiate with terrorists. Mixed signals came from the coalition partner DYP, 
which found itself in the dilemma of having been hawkish by reputation in the 
past but was now in government together with the Welfare Party. 
In the meantime, Welfare Party deputy Erbas tried to convince the leaders 
about the preconditions and proposals for peace. His proposals to the Turkish 
government included: the release of the arrested Kurdish deputies; partial 
amnesty for other prisoners; Kurdish education in private schools; and Kurdish 
broadcasting at certain hours on the state television. Erbas' suggestions to the 
PKK were: a ceasefire, an end to border violations by the armed forces, and the 
release of captured Turkish soldiers. 
This caused an immediate reaction from the National Security Council and 
President Demirel. The army openly stated that it was not happy with the 
mediation effort. Later, the DYP also adopted a clear hardliner position. On the 
basis of these reactions from the opposition parties and the military establish-
ment, the mediators had to declare that, in their efforts, they were representing 
themselves and not the government or the Welfare Party. Even Prime Minister 
Erbakan now declared that the state could not negotiate with terrorists. How-
ever, a few days later, the mediation team became involved in a project to 
secure the release of Turkish soldiers held by the PKK, and visited PKK camps 
where these soldiers were being held. A representative from the OSCE Kurdestan 
Human Rights Project acted as go-between with the PKK. However, the PKK 
did not release the soldiers, and demanded that there be an official representa-
tive from the government if any deal was to be struck. This in turn caused 
strong reactions from the opposition parties, who demanded Erbas' resigna-
tion. In December, however, six soldiers were freed by the PKK. 
The heated public debate and criticism arising from these two attempts at 
mediation were broadly based on the following arguments: (1) The state cannot 
negotiate with terrorists; (2) These efforts were simply vote-gathering populist 
attempts made by the Welfare Party; (3) The choice of mediators was question-
able (because of their previous relations with the PKK and their Islamist 
background); (4) The design of the intervention process was inadequate (pub-
lic, not private; the media were manipulated, etc.) As a result of all this criticism 
the Welfare Party stepped back and kept a low profile about the issue. At the 
Welfare Party convention, party leader and prime minister Necmettin Erbakan 
was careful not to mention the Kurdish problem at all. 
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4. PASSING OBSERVATIONS 
a) The Kurdish problem is not viewed as a supra-party issue in Turkish domestic 
politics. The 1996 mediation attempt was treated by the opposition parties 
along opposition lines, secularists opposing a ruling Islamist party. 
b) The nature of 'non-military' solutions is not clear in the minds of the main 
actors. The term is generally used to refer to approaches that focus on improv-
ing the economic and social conditions of the region. Direct means to solve the 
problem, such as mediation and negotiation, are not welcomed. 
c) There is also confusion in the identification of the deeper causes of the problem. 
The Democratic Left Party bases its argument on the feudal structure of the 
region. The business community sees the problem as one of underdevelop-
ment. The hawks, such as DYP and MHP, see foreign plots as a main factor; to 
the military and the hawks, the problem is also one of terrorism. Lack of 
democracy, an identity problem and psychological factors are cited by the 
Kurdish and Alawite parties. One element which is common to all is the 
perception that economic reform in the region is imperative. 
 
d) There is a problem in finding a legitimate counterpart for mediation and 
negotiations. Turkey has one, newly established, political party based on 
Kurdish ethnic identity: this is the DKP, which is not currently represented in 
the National Assembly. Most deputies of Kurdish origin are scattered among 
different mainstream political parties. An attempt to form a distinct Kurdish 
political party was made in 1991, and 22 deputies from the pro-Kurdish 
People's Labor Party (HEP) were elected. In 1993, the HEP was outlawed by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that the integrity and the unity of Turkey 
had been violated. It successors, the Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) 
and the DEP, were also banned by the Constitutional Court. These develop-
ments have caused a major problem in finding a legitimate Kurdish counter-
part party in the parliamentary system. 'Dialogue with whom?' is the major 
dilemma that the advocates of a non-military solution face. Moreover, the 
ruling elite assumes that the 'other' party or a possible 'third' party should have 
a 'pure' background, i.e., a lily-white record on the conflict. In such a prolonged 
conflict this is surely an impractical and unrealistic expectation. 
e) The ruling elite, by adopting either a hardline attitude or no attitude at all, 
has lost its leverage for generating a political solution. Mainstream political 
actors are faced with two dilemmas. One is how to disassociate themselves 
from the already-committed hardline positions without losing face and votes (a 
dilemma mainly experienced by ANAP and DYP); another is how to initiate a 
peace attempt without becoming the black sheep of the system (a dilemma of 
socialist or left parties). Over-nationalistic policies on the issue impede collec-
tive action for finding a solution. 
The inability to generate a viable solution is further reinforced by the 
current general incapacity of the Turkish polity to produce public policy on 
almost any of the serious economic, social, and international problems facing 
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the country. It is evident that politics in general has been reduced to a game of 
capturing public resources and then redistributing them through legal and 
illegal means. There is an almost complete absence of meaningful debate 
among the political elite. In rare cases when policy proposals are made, 
political debate immediately disregards the substantive elements of such 
proposals, and degenerates into shallow attacks. In effect, policy debates are 
subverted, manipulated, and transformed into an instrument for debasing and 
condemning opponents. 
f) The fact that the political system cannot generate a viable process for a po-
litical solution, renders by default the military solution adopted by the army the 
only available solution. The recent collective opposition by the secular front 
(mainstream left and right) has de facto legitimized the military alternative. 
g) Improvement of the Kurdish region's economic and social living conditions is 
viewed as the mechanism to solve the conflict peacefully. This is a necessary 
condition for dealing with the problem, but it remains to be seen whether 
economic investment in the region can become a sufficient condition to stop 
the war. 
h) There is an irony as regards the economic cost of the Kurdish conflict. Drug 
trafficking, as a by-product of the conflict, has been pumping considerable 
sums into the system. This has turned out to be one of the factors which prevent 
a total collapse of the economy. The gray economy has also generated interest 
groups who have a stake in the conflict's continuation. 
5. CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT 
Literature on conflict termination emphasizes several variables that impede or 
facilitate such a process.32 The main variables are: (a) a major change in the 
power configuration, such as a major offensive; (b) a hurting stalemate, one that 
imposes increasing costs to the parties and is also associated with a low 
probability of success and a high probability of a future disaster; (c) a change in 
leadership producing a new leader who can break with traditional stands on 
the conflict; (d) increasing opposition by pressure groups and opposition 
parties; (e) the emergence of a prospect for a new international alliance; (f) the 
presence or absence of foreign support; and (g) a major change in the interna-
tional climate. 
In the Kurdish conflict it seems difficult to expect any major change in the 
relative power configurations of the Turkish Army and the PKK. Despite 
statements by the Army on an almost annual basis that by 'the end of the year' 
the PKK will vanish, this has not yet occurred. At present, the conflict is at a 
stalemate. Despite the heavy cost to the Turkish side, the mentality of 'too much 
has been invested to quit' dominates the logic of decision-makers. There is still 
the belief that in conjunction with military measures, economic and social 
investments will end the problem. From the PKK's point of view, time would 
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seem to be working for them: they are increasingly able to make their voice 
heard internationally and have become better and better organized in Europe 
and the USA. Therefore, although a stalemate exists, the parties to the conflict 
still entertain high hopes for success. 
The previous change in the government did not have a serious impact on 
termination of the conflict, mainly because the Welfare Party had only 20% of 
the total vote. The lack of political power is an impeding factor in executing 
policies, given the strong reactions of the opposition parties and the army. In 
June 1997, a new ANAP/DSP coalition government under Prime Minister 
Mesut Yilmaz, the head of the Motherland Party, was formed. Improvement of 
the economic conditions of the region is the main priority of this government as 
regards the Kurdish problem. Issues such as cultural or ethnic rights are not 
mentioned in the government's program. This was interpreted as reflecting the 
strong influence of the coalition partner Bulent Ecevit, a former prime minister 
and the leader of Democratic Left Party, who claims that the essence of the 
Kurdish problem is economic. It would be unlikely to expect a drastic attempt 
by this new government to seek a solution to the problem, since its formation 
was the product of a collective effort of the secularist mainstream political 
parties and the military against the ruling Islamist party. 
The performance of the new government is not expected to differ sharply 
from the existing patterns of political behavior or challenge the political culture 
under which Turkish political institutions are shaped. Political parties have 
become vehicles for nurturing clients and redistributing profits. Less emphasis 
has been put on a national vision, skills in statecraft, and problem solving. 'The 
national assembly becomes less a forum of debate, deliberation and policy 
making, and more an organization of individuals who are under constant 
pressure to repay their liabilities to narrowly defined constituencies.'33 
As for the role of public opinion, the conflict has caused an increase in 
nationalist sentiments as casualties increased. In addition, the relationship 
between economic hardship and the conflict is not apparent to the average 
citizen, mainly because the media have acted as a party in the psychological 
warfare between the government forces and the PKK, rather than providing 
objective accounts of the current situation. That is why there is no effective 
opposition from below to stop the conflict. On the other hand, as noted before, 
there are various NGOs which are active. Since the political apparatus is 
inadequate for generating a viable solution to the conflict, increasing pressure 
from below through NGOs and interest groups would seem to be the only way 
to make a difference. 
As for the effect of a new international alliance, in similar conflicts, promises of 
membership in an international organization, such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
NATO, or the EU, have often been used by the mediators as an incentive to end 
conflicts. Turkey's joining the European Union is under negotiation, but imme-
diate membership is not likely in the short term. It would seem that membership 
in a new alliance or organization does not constitute an incentive and cannot 
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impose standards or conditions for ending the conflict. In fact, as the conflict persists, 
it becomes increasingly more difficult for Turkey to be accepted as a full member of 
the EU precisely because of its record on democratization, as highlighted by the 
conflict, and the associated human rights problems. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the perspectives of the official mainstream Turkish actors, the Kurdish conflict 
in Turkey is not yet ripe for resolution. One reason is that the Turkish political actors 
share different views about its origins. Second, officials do not feel that all alternatives 
have been fully explored. Third, economic hardships have not caused a total 
breakdown of the economy. Finally, national identity crises which emerged during the 
period of the RP/DYP government have resulted in the over-domination of a Kemalist 
nationalist ideology based on monocultural understanding of nationhood and the 
principle of protecting the unity of the existing Turkish state. 
The official Turkish actors are extremely sensitive to any outside conflict-resolution 
intervention, regarding such attempts as violations of Turkey's sovereignty or as parts 
of international plots to weaken Turkey. Any direct intervention by outsiders - 
especially without due consideration as to timing, target, and content - is likely to have 
a negative impact on the domestic peacemaking activities, as well as on the 
improvement of the Turkish democracy in general. At this stage, a productive policy 
could be to empower the domestic NGOs who are interested in resolution of the 
conflict, combined with wide-ranging efforts to acquaint the political actors with skills 
and training in conflict resolution. 
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